TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF INDIAN STATE AND THE ROLE OF MIDDLE CLASS

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The paper discusses the emerging nature of the Indian state and predominant role of middle class in the shaping of its present character. Middle class is defined as a class which is increasingly acquiring the 'legitimacy' to speak on behalf and for the society. With the help of fieldwork, the paper argues that the socio-political and economic influence of middle class is pervasive in both urban and rural areas and their class position mostly overlaps with their caste location.

INTRODUCTION

While studying the state, Philip Abrams (Abrams 1988) suggests that states can be studied analytically by dividing them into the state-system and the state-idea. The former refers to a 'palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in government' and the latter explains the idea about the state, projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies and different time'(Abrams 1988:82). The latter can be understood as the ideological grounding of the state giving legitimacy to the practice of state power (state-system). In other words, the functional institutions of the state governing everyday practice cannot be divorced from its ideological structure. The latter not only gives birth to the former, but both of them continuously shape each other. Together they shape and define the character of the state.

It is in this context that it is enormously challenging as well as exciting to unravel the character of the Indian state. It is an enormous challenge because the Indian polity is home to a multitude of socio-economic and political patterns, which disallow easy generalization. It is also exciting to analyze because of the inherent dynamism in the polity which quickly unsettles known socio-economic and political patterns and leaves behind a feeling that the existing understanding about the state may be lacking.

But why do we study the nature or character of the state? An understanding of the character of the state on the part of the students studying state enables them to comment on the vision of the state, its institutions and processes (as reflected in the laws, policies, and programmes and other executive actions). More importantly, it allows them to understand how they are shaped and affected by the existing socio-economic and political formations.

A SYNOPTIC VIEW OF THE INDIAN STATE IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE

The coming of Independence also saw the foundation of the modern Indian state based on secular principles and a written constitution, having a discernable socio-economic and

political programme for the country and her citizens. The state as an institution was seen as both state system and state idea – in the context referred to earlier. Nandy argues that it was expected that the state would usher in the ideology of modernisation that would become the basis of a more coherent form Indianness, overriding the enormous diversity. Secondly, it was also expected that over a period of time, 'state would give way to its working conditions to the universal principles of statecraft and able to persuade, mobilise or coerce the society to adjust to the state's ideology' (Nandy: 2000: 67). The ideology of the new nation state was formally enshrined in the Constitution of India promising to its citizens a sovereign, democratic, secular and socialist republic. The various aspects of the state idea were delineated in the bulky Constitution which in turn mandated an array of administrative, political and legal institutions, including specialised institutions of coercion to implement this vision in practice. The Constitution reflected the state idea but it was further and more eloquently articulated in the Directive Principles of State Policy.

It is in this context that the state as an institution was also seen as a source of remedies for all problems. In Khilnani's words, the state 'etched itself into the imagination of India in a way that no previous political agency had ever done' (Khilnani: 1998: 41). However, the 62-year journey of the Indian State can be seen as a story of failures, marginal successes as well as a source of tremendous hope.

This story has been interpreted differently by various scholars. The foremost among them are the scholars who emphasise the state system rather than the state idea. There are three sets of scholars who understand the character of the state through the study of state systems. The first group can be broadly clubbed as the scholars who took a state-centric view. Kohli, Bardhan , Rudolphs, and Vanaik all see the state as having a sort of autonomous existence, albeit also constrained by dominant interests of various types. Kohli (1987) makes a distinction between the state and political regimes and shows the possibility 0f a political regime having an ideology that is left-of-centre remaining substantially autonomous from vested interests while executing pro-poor policies. Bardhan's (1987) eloquent thesis points to the possibility of the state 'neither acting at behest nor on the behalf of the proprietary classes' (P.38). This unique condition is achieved because the three dominant proprietary classes - rich farmers, industrial capitalists, and professionals (both civil and military including white collared workers) - are not able to command hegemony over each other, thereby allowing the state to acquire a certain kind of autonomy. However, this autonomy is reflected in a regulatory role (and hence patronage-dispensing role) rather than a developmental role. The thesis is also broadly endorsed by Vanaik (1990). However, Vanaik also stressed the relative political strength of the agrarian bourgeoisie in the dominant coalition, a thesis also supported by Rudolphs (1987) and Varshney (1995). Rudolphs's story of the career of the state is also told in terms of conflicts between demand polity (when societal demands expressed as electoral pressures dominate over the state) and command polity (when state hegemony dominates over society). In the course of the conflict, the state is seen as a 'self-determining third actor' and by far the most powerful organisational entity, when seen in relation with organised capital and organised labour.

The second set of scholars study the state system from the society-centric perspective. The society-centric perspective seeks to analyse and reflect on the crises in the Indian state. Kothari sees the crisis in the centralisation and monopolisation of political parties and state institutions by political elite thereby undermining essential features of liberal democracy. He further argues that the role of political parties to channelize the demands of the people in the political system has degraded to the extent that democracy as a system is neither functional nor procedural. The state increasingly does not curb violence of the powerful against the weak. Moreover, the state itself resorts to illegitimate violence against the people. In Kothari's view, state itself has turned against democracy. In Kohli's (1990) later work, the failure of the state to live up to its declared agenda is attributed to the logic of democracy. The deepening of democracy, in Kohli's view, has led to enhanced political participation which in turn has multiplied demands on the state that the latter is not able to meet. Satish Saberwal (1996) argues that the crisis of the Indian state stems from the chasm between formal institutions of modernity based on the rational principle of impersonality and the logic of the traditional order which upholds segmentation along the social identity. The logic of segmentation, in his view, frustrates the modernist aspirations of impersonality required for the functioning of a modern secular state. Roy (2006) through the story of the Narmada dam explains that the development initiatives favouring the rich and entrenched groups are invariably identified as national development. Any opposition to it is seen as anti-national. The brunt of national development (read elite-centric development) is borne by the poor, especially those who belong to the historically deprived social groups.

The third set of scholars study the state system anthropologically. The anthropological approach has meant that they painstakingly document the interaction of the local level state with the mass of citizenry for whom the (non)actions of the state matter the most. The very characteristic of the local state also implies that they do not study the character of the state through the nature of its policies, but how they are implemented or not implemented and often changed beyond recognition during execution. In these writings, the character of the state is understood through the proxy analysis of political mobilisation, corruption affecting citizens, especially the poor, and role of social identity affecting the outcome of state policies.

Gupta (1995) analyses corruption and the local state ethnographically and argues that corruption 'draws attention to powerful cultural practices by which the state is symbolically represented to its employees and to the citizens' (Gupta 1995:385). He further explains: 'The discourse of corruption is central to our understanding of the relationship between the state and social groups precisely because it plays this dual role of enabling the people to construct the state symbolically and to define themselves as citizens. For it is through such representation, and through the public practices of various government agencies, that the state comes to be marked and delineated from other organisations and institutions in social life'(Gupta:389; Gupta 1995:389). Thus, corruption appears to be the central idiom through which the citizen's relationship with the state is structured.

Often, but not always, the (non)action of the state and how it is executed vis-a- vis the poor is explained from the lens of caste, religion, ethnicity and other social identity.

Bailey's (1963) important contribution in the early 1960s told us about the role of factional leaders (often inspired by social identity) as brokers between local and state levels. In effect, Bailey indicated how faction leaders, often identified through particular social groups, seek and get favours through the patronage-dispensing machinery of the state, in return for their political support to the political regime. For Harriss-White (2003), the present gradual withdrawal of the state does not alter the character of the state for the poor. In her account, the state was never present for the poor since it was always captured by the elites in their vested interests. She further argues that the outcomes in the economy are shaped at the intersection of caste, gender, religion and ethnicity. She terms this the social structure of accumulation. Violence against the lower castes and class is an integral part of the social structure of accumulation regime. That the decline of traditional authority is questionable is also shown in Lerche's work (1995) on western Uttar Pradesh. He convincingly shows the capture of the state system by the Jat landowners to their advantage.

There are other influential accounts which discuss the character of the state from the vantage point of state-idea. Chatterjee (1993) put forth a thesis that Indian nationalism created a division between the spiritual and material domains. The spiritual domain was believed and upheld as autonomous, one which cannot be affected by any foreign thought. The nation considered itself culturally superior to the colonizers. However, the west was taken as superior in the material domain (the domain of economy and of the state craft, of science and technology) and hence the experience of the western nations was to be replicated. The Constitution of India itself provides the best example of the acceptance of the western thought and practice (enlightened thought) which is most eloquently articulated in it. The key institutions of modern state - liberal democracy, universal adult franchise, an independent judiciary, citizenship, secularism, institutions of governance – were all put in place in the formative year (Austin: 2000). Given the framework for the new republic, the institution of planning was expected to carve out a modern nation state. In other words, the all-powerful, all-knowing state, taking the help of a body of experts, was to set the development agenda and its governance arm was to execute the agenda (Chatterjee: 2000). In its operational form, the character of the state was interpreted as one which is ushering in a passive revolution in the Gramscian sense of the term, that is, 'where an emergent bourgeoisie lacks the social conditions for establishing the complete hegemony over the new nations, it resorts to a 'passive revolution', by attempting a molecular transformation of the old dominant classes into partners in a new historical block and only a partial appropriation of the popular masses' (Chatterjee: 1986: 30). Kaviraj (1989) also substantiates this thesis of the passive revolution of capital through provision of an overview of the political history of independent India. He shows how power has to be shared between various dominant classes because no one class had the ability to exercise hegemony on its own. His political history elaborates on the dominance and decline of the industrial capitalists, the rural elites and the bureaucratic managerial elite in various phases of political history. The ascendance of one class was always at the expense of other. Chatterjee (2008) in his latest work argues

that the present phase of passive revolution has substantially altered. He argues that there is a clear cut ascendance of corporate capital in the present market-friendly India. Corporate capital still acquires surplus through primitive accumulation (disassociation of labour from the means labour). However, the passive revolution of capital, under the conditions of a vibrant electoral democracy, makes it 'unacceptable and illegitimate for the government to leave these marginalised populations without the means of labour to simply fend (for) themselves' (p.62). Hence the state launches a battery of development schemes perceived to be pro-poor to reverse the effect of primitive accumulation, albeit their ability to absorb the peasant society in the corporate economy is minimal.

Other authors introduce a critique of the 'original' state-idea. Madan (1987) and Nandy (1990) see the roots of crisis in the state due to alien western institutions imposed by the westernised elite on the ordinary masses. Western democracy for the masses was alien and religion was 'the' principle for governing the social conduct. The people are not ready to accept that beliefs cherished by them hold no or minimal value in the public domain. According to them, this is the source of crisis in the Indian state often reflected on the question of secularism.

These informed debates about the character of the Indian state help us build on these insights for a possibly new thinking on the state. In all these accounts of the character of the state, the argument which comes out quite forcefully suggests that the boundaries between state and civil society are quite porous. These more often than not act detrimental to the interest of the poor. What makes the boundaries of the state porous? Is it only the corporate interest or rent-seeking endeavours of the state? How do we relate the macro interpretation of the character of the state with micro (anthropological literature on state) socio-political patterns? The influential writings of Chatterjee (2004 & 2008) try and answer this puzzle by invoking the concept of political society. Political society is the realm where strategic negotiations of the marginalised communities take place with the state and help in reversing the adverse effect of primitive accumulation by corporate capital. This begs another question: Is political society homogenous? Is the relationship of all social groups in the realm of political society on equal terms with the state? Is there no domination and subordination within the realm of political society? If there is, how is it effected? How is the relationship of the macro level state carved out with the micro level political society? How does the relationship acquire apparent stability?

These are the few questions we will explore in our attempt to understand the nature of Indian state. While doing so, we will also trying to understand the ascendance of the middle class and their relationship with their caste identity.

THE NATURE OF INDIAN STATE:
ROLE OF MIDDLE CLASS AND UPPER CASTE

The Indian state, as ever, is still a bundle of contradictions. Some important contradictions present in the Indian state are discussed below.

The Contradiction of the Economics of Markets and the Politics of Democracy

The present Indian state is shaped by the contradictory movements of markets and democracy. The contradiction emanates from an ideological commitment to market-led development which has failed to include the assetless and capability-less while the institutions of democracy promise equitable inclusion. In other words, the contradiction in the Indian state is between the economics of markets and the politics of democracy. The former indicates economic policies directed towards a market-friendly regime. The economics of markets is supported by the hitherto national bourgeoisie in alliance with international capital and also finds empowering support and encouragement from the neo- neo-liberal mandarins and urban-based middle and upper middle classes. Politics of democracy is represented by the electoral compulsions of the political parties to be perceived as working for the large mass of the impoverished citizenry. Economics of markets excludes people lacking in assets and capabilities, while political formations try to include them through the politics of democracy. The politics of democracy is no longer limited to the perception of political empowerment but its very nature requires concrete policy demands for inclusion in the economic process (the latest avtar being NREGA). The general election of 2009 and the past few state level elections are testimony to this fact. One of the crucial reasons for the political regimes successfully negotiating the anti- incumbency factor was due to fact that they were seen as pro-poor. The elections results in fact were the reinforcement of the trajectory of the Indian state to weld itself more strongly in the new liberal regime presided over by the international capital. The institutions which support these contradictory trends are shown in Chart I, Appendix I.

On the nature of these Contradictory Institutions

The institutions formed to regulate the market are believed to be efficient.

> The recommendations of these institutions are mostly accepted.

> Perhaps it can be said that institutions do not shape the policy idea but pre-conceived ideas give birth to the market regulating and promoting institutions.

> A broad consensus already exists among the political elites over the policy ideas, and the institutions are constituted to put them in practice.

> This broad consensus allows a convergence of efforts between all concerned government departments.

On the other hand, the institutions supported by the political democracy are mostly conceived because of the constant pressure from below.

(i) Many of the institutions demanded from below invariably go against the interests of the markets.

(ii) There is neither a similar ideological commitment (as seen for institutions governing the markets) nor a political will to translate the work of these institutions (created by the demand of political democracy) into policy outcomes.

(iii) The fact is best reflected in the recent years, in the toned down version of the unorganised sector bill and the limping implementation of NREGA. On the other

hand one can marvel at the ease with which the JNURM, SEZs, public private partnership have already acquired the necessary political will and are giving excellent results from the standpoint of their given political mandate.

These institutions governing the markets reflect the priority of merely 9-15 percent of the Indian population. In this sense, the dominant coalition of Bardhan has been substantially reworked. The coalition comprises of industrial capitalists (in partnership with foreign capital), agro-mercantile capitalists (owning large farms in countryside but also having economic stakes in the nearby urban areas), and politico-administrative elite having a firm faith in the trajectory of market-based development and the burgeoning middle class benefiting from the new found purchasing power to enjoy the 'modern' market-based consumerism. The middle class in the present context can be described as a powerful social group, not necessarily located in big metros, and who have acquired the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the society.

The second contradiction is between the dominant capitalist class at the national level and the similar dominant class at the state level. The nature of economic growth is perhaps contingent on the convergence of priorities between the national and state level dominant social groups. The more the convergence, the better the possibility of states reflecting the national priorities. The more the divergence, the more different the trajectories in pursuit of economic growth. This is best reflected in the unevenness of the reforms between national level and state levels as well as between states; the official explanation given for this failure being the incapacity to conceive policy measures to open up markets and failure to provide adequate infrastructure. This is not a plausible reason because this logic has been given for almost 15 years. It is more likely that there was no political will to open up. There seem to be reasons for this:

(a) The first reason can be located in the recent history. The regions which were able to throw up stronger sub-national capitalists based on regional identity took the lead in developing industry-based economies (Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, etc). These regions were early to integrate themselves in the national economic reforms. Other regions which have the political presence of dominant agriculture landlords never wanted to open up their economy (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan etc).

(b) At many times, the interests of the national capitalists do not coincide with the dominant/ entrenched regional/ state capitalists. Hence any market-oriented reforms are not easily possible. For instance, market reforms in the leather goods industry and mining sector were substantially delayed in several states for this reason. On the other hand, the mining sector reforms in Orissa (having substantial stake of state level capitalists) were never rolled back inspite of serious and intense protest by the local poor affected by the projects[1].

(c) The dominance at the state level is again through a coalition of regional agro/ industrial capitalists (regulating their interests and influencing the state apparatus through a combination of caste, religion, region and language), politico-social elites

and the middle class (which also includes substantial rural-based middle class). A combination of social identities (religion, caste, ethnicity etc.) is used to regulate the economy and shape up accumulation.

The third contradiction is at the local level where the any fruits of democratic struggle and market expansion are captured by the entrenched / dominant caste /class/ religion. This results in a variety of conflicts. Most of the government programmes are captured by the dominant social groups. The local dominant coalition at the local groups is constituted by dominant caste groups, local bureaucracy/politicians and the muscle power of the politicians and dominant groups. The accumulation at the local level is shaped by state pilferage and caste domination where all or most of the dominant groups are the stakeholders.

WHAT IS THE OUTCOME OF THESE THREE CONTRADICTIONS?

There has been a proactive measure taken by the state to open up the economy to private capital, both national and international, through 'efficient' governance. This has resulted in exceptionally high and sustained economic growth. But it has also resulted in extreme social inequality. The manifestation of the extreme social inequality can be captured through the following facts:

> The growth, as a result of the integration with the globalisation, has bypassed the majority of Indian population. 77 percent of the population continues to live below less than $2 per day (the internationally accepted poverty line) of daily per capita consumption expenditure. In terms of total population, the poor and vulnerable were 836 million out of a total population of 1,090 million in 2004-05, compared to 732 million out of 894 million in 1993-94. If we disaggregate this data in terms of social groups- 87 percent of SC/STs survive with earnings below $2 per day, nearly 85 percent of Muslims also earn around or below $2 (Sengupta et.al: 2008)

> The middle and high income groups which have been disproportionately benefited by growth constitute nearly 24 percent of the population. Out of this, Middle Income groups that earn around $4 per day constitute 19.3 percent. The high income group with an income bracket of $10.2 or more is constituted of merely 4 percent of the population (Sengupta et.al: 2008).

> The high middle and high income groups are mostly concentrated in upper caste Hindus. There is a thin layer among the minorities, Dalits and Adivasis (See Appendix 2).

It is this fraction of population, ranging anything between 8-15 percent (taking the average) which constitutes the middle class in India. This is the socio-economic group that has acquired the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the society and are the most ardent supporters of globalisation (neo-liberal policies). This group is not only economically prosperous but also commands social dominance in the society. A high proportion of the members of this group are upper caste Hindus.

Thus the main question which arises: what gives the Indian state an apparent stability in face of such massive social inequality? We explore this question through the help of three interrelated explorations. The first comment is made on the nature of party system, followed by two case studies.

(i) Nature of Party System

The Indian party system has moved from a one-party-dominant system to a competitive multiparty system – with existence of two parties at the state level, the diversity of which gives the appearance of a multiparty system at the national level[2]. At the present juncture this theorisation only empowers us to know of the existence of several political parties. In other words, the emergence of various political parties was expected to represent the agenda of the social groups which were the original cause of their electoral empowerment. The presence of numerous political parties was also to reflect the existing social cleavage in the society. Instead the political plurality (increase in number of political parties) has not necessarily translated into social plurality. In other words, the political and socio-economic agenda of all political parties almost converge, save some token articulation of the core issues affecting their core constituency, as revealed by an analysis of the manifestos of all major national and regional parties. Moreover, in practice, the dominant left parties have also failed to exhibit a different vision for the economic development of the country. The apparent stability is in fact also (among other factors) a manifestation of the lack of genuine articulation of pro-poor voices in the political system.

(ii) Social Collectives, Political Mobilisation and the Local State

This section explores the emergence and role of select civil-social and religious collectives in political mobilization, i.e. ethno-religious groups, caste collectives, religious social orders and petty business and trade associations, the surfacing of new political and social elites at the local level and their relationship with the local state apparatus. The study is based on field surveys conducted in two urban centres of India, viz. Lucknow and Ahmedabad.

In the study, we documented the social collectives which are open and draw membership from a cross section of the population.

In an urban electoral setting, social collectives present themselves as an important medium through which political support is mobilised. In this regard, it is crucial to understand how they mobilise people and discipline individuals' minds towards the social and political agenda of the collectives.

The ethno religious groups try and manufacture consent for their agenda through the trajectory of 'discipline hatred and punishment'. Disciplining implies enlisting the support of the 'Hindus', activating them in campaigns and organising them under their leadership. In other words, Hindutvising the popular consciousness by constructing a social profile of minorities, especially Muslims, as culturally polluting, anti-national, pro-Pakistan, favoured at the expense of Hindus; driving a wedge between Christian Adivasis and Hindu Adivasis etc[3]. VHP works dextrously for developing unity between upper and lower castes by propagating that exploitation of Dalits by Brahmins is not the fault of the Hindu religion but the fault of individual(s). This has resulted in Dalits entering into the social constituency of Hindutva in large numbers, specifically in Ahmedabad. This nature of cultural and political disciplining has varied implications. It tries to create a consolidated 'Hindu' social block vis-à-vis minorities while also attempting to obscure the socio-economic and cultural differences

Chart I - Ethno Religious Groups				
Name of Social Collectivity	*City*	*Agenda*	*Nature of Membership*	*Political Party to which they are Ideologically/ Functionally Close*
Rashtriya Swamsewak Sangh (National Volunteer Crop)	Ahmedabad, Lucknow	Inculcates Hindutva ideology	Open	BJP
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council)	Ahmedabad, Lucknow	Performs aggressive and agitational role for promoting Hindutva	Open	BJP
Bajrang Dal	Ahmedabad, Lucknow	Militant wing of VHP and was started to provide muscle and manpower to VHP's agitation	Open	BJP
Sewa Vibhag Sewa International Sewa Bharti Vanwasi Kalyan Aashram Ekal Vidayalaya Foundation Vikas Bharti	Ahmedabad	Formed apparently to carry out social service to the community. In practice, provide entry point for carrying out core ideological work by ideological volunteers.	Open	BJP
Durga Vahini (Women's Front)	Ahmedabad, Lucknow	Organise Hindu women and inculcate religiosity, also provide entry point to ideological volunteers	Open	BJP
Hindu Jagran Manch (HJM),	Ahmadabad, Lucknow	Organise Hindu women and men, also provide entry point to ideological volunteers	Open	BJP
Chart II- Caste Collectives				
Patel Panchayat	Ahmedabad	Promotes caste solidarity and acts as an interest group	Restricted	BJP
Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha	Ahmedabad	do & influential in electoral politics	Restricted	BJP
Gujarat Kshatriya Sangh	Ahmedabad	do & influential in electoral politics	Restricted	BJP
Patidar Mandal	Ahmedabad	do	Restricted	BJP
Kurmi Masabha	Lucknow	do	Restricted	SP
Kyastah Mahasabha	Lucknow	do	Restricted	BJP/Congress
Vaish Mahasabha	Lucknow	do & influential in electoral politics	Restricted	BJP
Yadav Mahasangh	Lucknow	do	Restricted	SP
Kanya Kubj Brahmin Sabha	Lucknow	do	Restricted	BJP
Ravidas Sabha	Lucknow	Do	Restricted	Dalits

Chart III- Associations of Traders and Petty Business Associations				
Name of Social Collectivity	*City*	*Agenda*	*Nature of Membership*	*Political Party to which they are Ideologically / Functionally Close*
C G Road Business Association	Ahmedabad	Protects and promotes business interests of the members and develops and maintains cordial relationship with local politicians and government officers	Restricted	BJP
Vastrapur Shop Owners Association	Ahmedabad	do	Restricted	BJP
Ahmedabad Chemist Association	Ahmedabad	do	Restricted	BJP
Ahmadabad Brick Manufacturing Association	Ahmedabad	do	Restricted	BJP
Aliganj Vyapar Mandal	Lucknow	do	Restricted	Primarily SP
Aminabad Traders Association	Lucknow	do	Restricted	BJP
Ganesh Ganj Iron Merchant Association	Lucknow	do	Restricted	Primarily BSP & SP
Lucknow Goldsmith Association	Lucknow	do	Restricted	Primarily BJP
Brick Kilns Associations	Lucknow	do	Restricted	Primarily BJP
Khatik Vypar Mandal	Lucknow	Promotes caste solidarity and acts as caste business interest group	Restricted	BSP
Dhobi Sangh (Informal association of cloth washers involved in chikan garment trade.	Lucknow	Promotes caste solidarity and acts as caste business interest group	Restricted	BSP
Chart IV - Religious Social Order				
Murari Bapu	Ahmedabad	Gives religious/spiritual discourse, preaches equality of human beings but does not question the fundamental principles of caste-based social hierarchy	Open	BJP
Sant Shri Asaramji	Ahmedabad	-do-	Open	BJP
Neeb Karori Baba	Lucknow	-do-	Open	BJP
Nami Sharan Ashram	Lucknow	-do-	Open	BJP

within the 'Hindu' community. Further, it constructs an image of the Muslim community as polluting the Hindu social order. Hence they are culturally and socially unacceptable and as a consequence become object of intense hatred. Mass hatred by its very nature just requires

a trigger to inflame sentiments and flare up into physical violent demonstrations. The post-Godhra riots in Gujarat are apt examples of this hatred. Lucknow has not seen any explicit manifestation of hatred but bias against Muslims has grown tremendously.

The caste association invokes the loyalty of a group of men and woman towards their ascriptive identity. The associations try and organise people and communicate to them the potential benefits of a collective social front. Traditionally, the caste associations were used to settle intra-community disputes and mediate between inter-community disputes. This still holds true for rural India and also for urban India to some extent. However, caste associations have also shaped themselves into interest groups where they bargain with the state and other social groups for the socio-economic interest of their members. They do not have sophisticated tools of mobilisation, in comparison to ethno religious groups, but still they are able to command the loyalties of their community members. They operate independent of other similar associations but as and when required, they come together either against the state or other caste associations. The latter implies that the fault line of purity and pollution unite them against each other. In other words, as and when required, the upper caste associations unite, notwithstanding the differences between them, against the lower caste associations. The same also holds true for lower caste association. Caste associations, like the ethno religious groups, are able to invoke loyalties of individuals beyond face-to-face interactions of individuals, on common socio-economic and political interests. Upper caste associations also try and co-opt lower caste associations to their own agenda, by promising fringe benefits as well as by coercion.

The membership of religious social orders cut across caste, class, gender and vocation. Religious social orders, it was perceived, were able to blur the difference between various castes and communities. As discussed before, they do not question and mitigate the social hierarchy, but the members still perceive them as egalitarian. Leaders of caste associations and ethno religious groups devote themselves in efforts to being recognised as important members of these social orders. Due to this status, the respect commanded by the religious order also transfers, to an extent, to them. This gives them far more legitimacy in the eyes of their community.

The business associations are a crucial source of funding of these social collectives as well a resource for political donations. At times, some important and rich members also give large donations, which also raise their importance in the community. The important business associations are normally the ones which belong to the upper castes. The lower caste business associations do not normally contribute to such activities of raising money for the rent seekers in order to ensure the smooth running of their business.

The memberships of these social collectives overlap. Individual(s) constituting one particular collective, say a trade association, have social (ethno religious groups) and religious (religious social order) stakes in other collectives; and by virtue of belonging to a particular caste, also have their presence in caste associations. The prominent members of the traders associations, caste associations as well as the ethno religious groups are more or less the same individuals. Moreover, many of the government officials not only belong

to the caste associations but are also regular visitors to the religious discourses given at the religious order(s). Some of them are members of ethno religious groups and numerous others support them from outside. We also documented through newspapers' reports as well as through the perception of many respondents that lucrative postings and transfer of officers are governed by their choice of membership of social collectives. This should not be read as if the important individuals only constitute the social collectives. There is also a presence of not-so-socially important individuals as well as the labouring class. This particular fact gives these social collectives a numeric strength. The numeric strength in combination with financial resources of the trading community helps these social collectives to become a social force to reckon with.

In the urbane setting of the two cities covered by the study, these associations also use other sophisticated means to enlist the support of the new members, especially from the lower castes. Celebrating important lower caste festivals and associating them with Hindu festivals is an important event. For instance in Lucknow, even the apparently lower caste festival like Vishwakarma Puja[4] is celebrated with great fanfare by the Hindu Jagran Manch. The local political bosses of the Sangh preside over the function and also distribute gifts to the working class. The working class is mobilised in a manner that a majority of them belong to lower castes. Similarly, all the caste Hindu festivals are celebrated with great enthusiasm. In the caste Hindu festivals too, the working class is mobilised (read Dalits) in both the cities, and gifts are distributed. This nature of mobilisation and subsequent distribution of gifts is through the ward level leaders and members. Other mobilisation techniques which have religious or social significance through carving out extended social networks ensure an ever increasing mass base of these collectives. The ward level leaders are important cadres who can in turn politically guide the network during the time of electoral contest.

The social networks carved out with the help of social collectives try and satisfy different classes of people through different systems of patronage and benefits. The elite members of the social collective are able to extract different extralegal concessions or facilitation of their interests due to their proximity with the elites in the political and bureaucratic structure. The lower class and caste of people are not only given gifts but they are also the ones to have a first claim on the development goods. The latter may be their right but they are bestowed like favours; as rewards for their membership of social collectives. This not only makes them more committed to the social collectives but also to the political regime supported by that particular social collective. This is also a mechanism where every class of people tries to form an alliance with people higher up the class ladder for perceived or real benefits. The lowest class/ caste tries to form a social alliance with the leader of the social collective who in turn tries to forge an alliance with leaders up the hierarchy or important government officials and prominent professionals. This extended social network ensures the demise of horizontal caste/ class solidarity and constructs a vertical caste / class alliance.

In our case study, we do find a collective articulation as well as entry of newer groups into the political and social processes. In one sense, it can be called deepening of democracy but frankly, we fail to perceive any democratisation of society, polity and economy. The so

called deepening of democracy has resulted in a readjustment of social, political, legal and administrative institutions in their attempt to maintain status quo. The status quo has meant the hegemony of the entrenched castes and classes operating in a dominant coalition at the local level. The dominant coalition comprises of local politicians, including musclemen, bureaucrats and traders. The coalition, through the medium of social collectives, co-opts the dissenting world views with the help of the extended social network. The social identities of caste, religion, and ethnicity which fragment the working classes, become a source of unity between the dominant coalition partners in the interest of establishing their dominance, which, in practical terms, implies a blurring of the lines dividing the state, the civil society and the markets since the membership of these collectives, as explained earlier may overlap. Individual(s) - say a government official - constituting one particular collective, may have social and religious stakes in one or many social collectives. If the collectives and the executives managing the political regime understand society, politics and economics from the same vantage point, then the strength of the former translates into the might of the latter and vice versa. Similarly, the market in some goods may be controlled by few or many traders who may have social and religious stakes, along with the government officials in one of the many collectives. Their social proximity in the social collectives also allows members to exploit this proximity to use the state's resources in their favour. This is particularly true when it comes to issues relating to taxation and use of coercion to discipline the labour force. The administrative and police departments invariably side with business interests. Thus the social collectives mediate between traders, politicians and government officials to ensure a horizontal interaction between them and blur the dividing line between state and market and civil society.

(iii) Development Programmes, Social Conflict and Role of Dominant Communities

This section is informed by the study which was carried out to look into the social conflicts that unfold with the execution of development programmes. It was primarily a case study of four large and respected NGOs – Seva Mandir (South Rajasthan- bordering Gujarat); MARAG (South West Gujarat - Katch); MANAV KALYAN TRUST (Northern Gujarat – Sabarkantha); and UMBVS (Western Rajashtha- Jaiselmer and Jodhpur) – in several districts of rural Rajasthan and Gujarat (See Annexure III). All the NGOs work in partnership with the state (as community mobilisers and often as the executing agency of some specific part of the development programme), and are also funded by the national and international donors. The primary aim of the research was to analyse the role of NGOs in executing developmental programmes and their capacity to mitigate/ resolve social conflicts. However, it was soon realised that NGOs work is embedded in the larger socio-economic dynamics of the society, and is also constrained by the social relations existing in their area of operation. Moreover, NGOs' programmes cannot be seen in isolation from other developmental schemes conceived and implemented by the state. In other words, the work is only a sub-set of the gamut of developmental schemes and their outcomes are influenced by the local social dynamics.

The field visits revealed that the local socio-economic and political environment of the study area is structured by caste, class, ethnicity, gender and religion. The various social identities operate in different permutations and combinations for maintaining the status quo in favour of the dominant social group of that particular area, which in turn results in social conflict. Social conflict can be understood as patterned behaviour between different social groups that results in a strained relationship between two or more individuals or between different social groups. The cause of strained relationships is generally due to attempts on behalf of the social group(s) to maintain the socio-economic status quo in face of opposition/ assertion from the other social group(s). Thus conflict exists where two or more sets of actors are keen to achieve apparently incompatible goals, where the other party is perceived to stand in the way of these goals. Developmental resources always have the potency to give birth to newer social conflicts or exacerbate the existing/ dormant ones. The different types of conflicts in the study area are enumerated below.

CHART I- TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS		
Class-Based Social Conflicts		
	Groups Involved	Reason for Conflict
Inter Class	Labour, Small and Marginal Farmers Versus Landowner, Share Croppers versus Landlords	Wage Exploitation, Violent Guarding of Land and Privatised Common Property Resources, Issues pertaining to Water, Market, Political Contestation
	Mine owners versus Mine Workers	Over the issue of benefits etc
	Labour Contractor versus Labour	Wages
Intra Class	Contract Labour versus Organised Labour	Benefits
	Local versus Migrants	Labour Market Space
	Medium and Small Farmers Versus Big Landowners	Canal Water Distribution. Political Contestations
	Big Farmers Versus Big Farmers	Over the control of Cooperative, Land Disputes, Political Contestations
'Caste'/ Community -Based Conflicts		
Inter Caste	Dalits versus Upper Caste	Purity and Pollution, though now restructured, Control over Resources, Political Contestations
	Hindu Male Versus Dalit Female	Sexual Exploitation
Intra Caste/ Communities	Between Different Sub-Caste of Dalits	Purity and Pollution Issues
	Adivasis Versus Dalits	Purity and Pollution Issues
Capture of Local Sate		
Inter Caste and Inter Class	Entrenched/ Dominant Versus Socially/ Politically less Powerful	Cornering of State's resources, especially on the question of livelihood diversification

Inter and intra class conflicts, also acquires inter and Intra caste dimensions

Gender-Based Conflicts			
Inter and Intra Class as well as Inter and Intra Caste	Male vs. Female	Sexual Exploitation, Violence against Women and Control over Sexuality	Usually governed (not always) by protection of class interests
	Women Versus Women	Purity Pollution Issues, Religious Issues, 'Against Natural Social Order'	
Religion-Based			
Inter and Intra Class and by establishment organic unity amongst different castes	Muslims Vs Hindus	Stereotyping Muslims (terrorist, community which infringes the dignity of Hindu Women) Labour Market issues, Political Contestations	
Conflict Between NGO Beneficiaries versus Others Villagers			
Inter Class and Inter Caste		Perceived that they are left out of Beneficiary Lists	

NARRATIVE ON THE SOCIAL CONFLICTS

The conflicts are not always inter-class in nature but also acquire an intra-class dimension in our study area. For instance, the contest over the space in the labour market often results in conflict between migrant labour and local labour. This conflict is mostly triggered off when the local labour demand market rates for their work. In order to avoid the rightful demands of the labour, the owners of economic enterprises seek the help of a labour contractor and procure the required labour force from a different district or state. The influx of fresh labour force and consequent conflict between the migrant labour and the local labour over labour market space facilitates the owner of the capital to depress the wages. Similarly, there emerges a conflict between the organised labourers and contract informal labourers because the former get social security benefits as well as the prescribed official minimum wages. The contract labourers have to be content with market rates which are mostly below the prescribed minimum wages, and they are not entitled to any social security benefits. Further, the intra-class rivalry is not only between the labouring classes but also between owners of the capital. In our study area, this conflict gets most prominently manifested over the sharing of canal irrigation water, local elections - cooperatives as well as Panchayats - and over the control of skilled labourers.

It may be noted that these seemingly secular conflicts over class interests, more often than not, acquire a communal dimension. In the absence of any secular platform to articulate the common interests, the poor find the community identity as the only source of airing their collective voice. It gets manifested and further concretised as conflicts between social group(s) with the flow of developmental goods as well the lack of them, as both lack of development as well as development itself can be the cause and consequence of social conflict. Lack of development may spur demands by the poor households for claiming their rights

over developmental resources. The demand invariably affects the entrenched/ dominant social group who tends to control and channelise the developmental benefits in its favour. Similarly, development initiatives trigger off such conflict because the poor households may perceive that they are discriminated against in resource distribution. In practice, if the discriminator and discriminated happen to be the members of different social groups (which they invariably are), the conflict takes the form of inter social-group conflicts.

The conflicts get more prone to articulation on community lines because of the intra-class clash of socio-economic and political interests. For instance, the rural social geography of our study areas ensures that each community not only stays in close proximity but also own land side by side. Due to this historical pattern of ownership of land, a conflict over sharing of water often emerges. The community owning land closest to the canal (entrenched social groups) not only extract the maximum water but also store it in small ponds on their fields. This withdrawal of water more than their share is at the expense of other dominant as well as marginalised communities down the line of water channel. The worst sufferers are the tail-end users who happen to be the Dalits and Adivasis. However, this nature of conflict did not result in a natural alliance of communities excluded from their rightful share of water but instead, resulted in a conflict between the two dominant communities (Darbars and Rajputs) who were placed 1st and 2nd on the irrigation canal line. As a result of the conflict, an informal agreement between them emerged, facilitating some portion of water reaching the land owned by Rajputs. On the other hand, an alliance of all excluded communities would have been more beneficial since it might have facilitated the formation of institutions governing the sharing of water equitably. These kind of institutions could not be ever formed in the present political economy of our study area because the extra water extracted from the canal is sold to tail-end users by members of the same marginalised community who were excluded from their rightful claim to water. The Darbars in the areas are entrenched castes dominating the political field as well as controlling the local economy.

Such instances are numerous even among the marginalised social group, where their immediate material or social interest is a trigger for group solidarity, thereby ensuring some kind of conflict between different social groups. The most common source of conflict is the dispute over sharing the common property, especially fodder and water. The rampant illegal privatisation of these resources by the entrenched social groups has resulted in fierce conflict between the marginalised social groups over whatever is still left in the public domain. It has been documented by the study that Adivasis and Dalits as a group align with dominant communities for their short term interest against each other.

The conflict becomes more intense if the developmental initiatives seek to diversify the livelihood opportunities in the face of dwindling income from agriculture produce and agriculture labour. The new avenues are sought to be captured for maximum benefit by the more powerful social groups.

The differences between social groups and ensuing conflict over material resources get more intensified, especially between the dominant communities and marginalised social groups, with the invoking of stereotype constructa of the latter (Adivasis are lazy, Adivasis

and Dalits are pampered by politicians, Muslims support Pakistan etc). In the face of the growing assertion of marginalised social groups for claiming their rights over developmental resources, the dominant communities vehemently reinforce the cultural stereotypes in order to culturally and morally suppress them and thereby maintain the status quo in terms of their dominant status.

The construct of stereotype images also affects the social relationship between different communities drastically. As far as the social relationship between Dalits and other Hindu castes and Adivasis are concerned, it is marked by restructured rules of 'Purity and Pollution'. In some of the regions, even the Dalits are not allowed to wear slippers in the presence of the higher castes. The utensils are never shared. Almost every household has separate utensils for serving Dalits tea and refreshments on one hand, and on the other, a member of a higher caste rarely takes water or food in a Dalit household. Any inter-caste marriage is vehemently opposed and often results in violence. The may not be any explicit discrimination in school but Dalit students feel that they are not treated on equal terms by the teachers. The Dalits invariably have separate wells. When the drinking water is supplied by the government tankers, they have to stand outside the queue and their turn comes when all other communities have filled their water pots. Such incidents of discrimination against Dalits are manifold, and could be found in scores in our study area.

It may be noted that discrimination of Dalits is not only at the hands of upper castes. The same practice has been culturally internalised by Adivasis and Muslims who consider themselves culturally superior to Dalits. Besides this, there is an internal hierarchy within Dalits too. They also invoke the upper caste norms of 'Purity and Pollution' for ensuring internal differentiation and consequent superior-inferior social status. Harijans, Bhangis, Chamars are considered to be on the rung of the hierarchy and they are met with same treatment by Dalit sub-castes like Balais, Meghwals, and Paswans.

The collective strength of the different castes and communities comes from robust existence of Jati Panchayats. However, it is not to say that all such Jati Panchayats are equally powerful. The most powerful Panchayats in the study area were the ones belonging to the upper castes, namely Patels, Rajputs, Darbars and Jains. They are not only seriously rich, but belong to the middle strata, are better organised and have substantial influence in the local economy, polity and society. Many of the leaders of the Panchayats have economic stakes both in the village as well as nearby urban areas.

The difference between the upper caste Panchayats, the lower caste Panchayats and Adivasi Panchayats is that the latter two are not as competent as the former in influencing the local administration and controlling the local economy. It has been observed that the lower castes and Adivasi Panchayats mostly meet on primordial issues like elopement of their community women with men of different community/ caste.

Another prominent feature of the study area was the near absence of local state apparatus for mitigating these social conflicts. The author was repeatedly told that local officials and police choose not to interfere in the affairs of the Jati Panchayats. In other words, there seems be a parallel system of justice operating in our study area. Jati Panchayats seem to be an all-powerful body in deciding disputes over marriage, inter- caste violence, adultery etc.

Thus caste and community most jealously make all efforts to control the sexuality of their women. Endogamy, though not historically observed, has become the norm of the present social order. Any violation of the same is met with the strictest punishment possible. The nature of punishment is always decided by the Jati Panchayats. However, there again exists a strain in this type of caste and community discourse. A relationship by consent between a man and women of different caste is despised and viewed with contempt but frequent infringement of modesty and dignity of lower castes and Adivasi women by upper caste men (invariably outside the marital boundaries) are taken as normal and often considered as the right of the rich and powerful. Moreover, Jati Panchayats have never reacted against the violence against women within the family.

It seems that the discourses of Jati Panchayats make a distinction between the private and public. The former, implying marriage, is considered as a private affair and it has to be confined within the caste or community, and violation of this boundary has to be punished. Moreover, the affairs within the family are strictly private and outsiders cannot or should not interfere. In the public domain where the Jati Panchayats of lower castes and Adivasis do not command similar power and status, there is not much chance of taking a belligerent stand against higher castes. Moreover, the public domain is the 'domain of the man'. The male fraternity, it has been observed, are usually united against women, irrespective of social location. The best manifestation of this is the practice of Dakan in Udaipur. Dakan is an oppressive practice against women. It is believed when the woman is possessed by an evil spirit, she has to be cured by the complex religious rites which are preformed by the Ojha. Another explanation given of this social is that the woman is considered to be possessed by the evil spirit when she starts becoming assertive and reacts at times violently against the discrimination and oppression she faces within the family or outside. On such matters, the males of the village unite and force the woman to be taken to the Ojha. The symbol of such male unity is also reflected in the fact that all men contribute money as per their capacity towards the fee of the Ojha.

The violence against women, irrespective of her caste and class is the most commonly observed phenomenon. It appears there is no specific reason for the violence. In the dominant social construct, the men are supposed to be the main breadwinners, even if the women of the household are contributing substantially to the income basket of the family (given the feminisation of the workforce and increasing casualisation of the male workforce). In this milieu, if the man of the family is not able to make an entry in the labour market, the brunt of his frustration is faced by the woman often expressed through frequent beatings. Moreover, if he makes an entry in the labour market, he usually comes back home tired and often drunk and again the brunt of his anger is cushioned by the woman. Further, the women in the village are extremely discourteous to women of other religions and lower castes. Some women refer to grassroot NGO leaders as 'mislead and confused entities' under the influence of external agencies.

It was documented in the study area that that the internal contradictions between upper castes and Dalits, between Adivasis and Dalits, between Adivasis and upper castes, and

between men and women wane in contrast to those with Muslims and Christians. The current dominant political discourse has managed to portray Muslims as 'culturally and socially alien', 'terrorists' and 'supporters of our enemy', that is Pakistan. The Muslim men are considered to be sexual exploiters of Adivasi and Hindu women.

The discourse of right wing communalism is not only limited to Muslims but also take a tough political stand against the Christians. The missionaries are considered to be luring away the innocent Adivasis to the fold of their religion. It is notable that the Adivasi is not considered as smart and capable of fooling the upper castes but an innocent person who falls prey to the trap of missionaries.

In our study area, there have been numerous instances of violence against Muslims and re-conversion of Adivasi Christian to the Hindu fold. The well-orchestrated political and social discourse against Muslims and Christians is to form an organic unity among the caste Hindus and Adivasis and Dalits. The upper caste Jati Panchayats in association with right wing political party and social collectives organised few religious discourses in order to discipline the popular consciousness towards Hinduism. The end objective of all these attempts seems to maintain the current socio-economic and political status quo.

Even in the face of intense conflict, the dominance of middle income strata, predominantly belonging to the upper castes are able to dominate the local economy, polity and society. Again the membership of social collective (jati panchayats) is an important medium through which domination is effected. There may be strains between different dominant castes but they still negotiate with each other with more or less equal strength where one group may acquire relative ascendancy at the expense of other and vice-versa. Note, the articulation of historically deprived social groups is also through their collectives but they are mostly not in a position to negotiate with dominant groups at equal strength.

Towards a Tentative Conclusion: Segmented State and Role of Middle Class

In the above pages, we have indicated that the state can be seen as homogenous whole neatly tied at various levels in an organic whole.

> State is segmented with different interests constraining the state at different levels. Not all these interests compliment each other. The story of unevenness of economic reforms discussed earlier points out to this testimony of this fact. Moreover there is always a possibility that dominant interests at the federal level may not coincide with the entrenched interests at the local level.

> However, at all the levels, it is the middle class, albeit divided by caste, ethnicity and religion provides legitimacy and articulation to the existing pattern of division of roles and responsibilities in the society.

> Social identity (caste, religion, gender etc.) provides an important medium to articulate the domination since it makes the boundaries of the state, market and civil society porous.

Notes

1. Most of the foreign investment in India has an Indian partner. This symbiotic relationship allows the 'united' capital to manage their concern with the Indian state. There are instances, when national capital perceives an adverse inclusion/treatment at the hands of international collaborator. During such occurrences, they have sought the help of the state and the Indian state has come to the rescue them because of their political outcry against foreign 'domination'. The same pattern is visible in the relationship between state level capitalist vis-à-vis national level capitalist s. Hence the national capital has acquired international dimension but it has still retain its Indian roots due to (a) economic reason – large markets (b) political –seeking support of the state under 'adverse' inclusion in the international economic regime.

2. Yadav, 1996

3. This is not true for Lucknow.

4. Vishwakarma Puja is a day when the working class offer Puja to the tools and implements of their trade from which they derive their livelihood.

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Appendix I

Institutions Supporting Economics of Market and Politics of Democracy

Institutions Supporting Economics of Markets			Institutions Mandated By Politics of Democracy		
Market Creating		Market Regulating Institutions	Market Legitimising Institutions	Institutions Giving a Call for Inclusive Development	Watch dog Institutions
Withdrawal of State	To Attract new players.				National Integration Council/
Foreign Direct Investment Policy 2006 (started with Industrial Policy of 1991)	Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA)	The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission	National Investment Fund	National Advisory Council (now defunct)	National Judicial Council/ National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions National Minority Commission
Board for Reconstruction of Public Sector Enterprise (Ministry of Disinvestment)	Committee on Infrastructure	The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India	National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector	Panchayats and Urban Local Bodies	National Commission for Backward Classes Act National Commission for Women
The Fiscal Responsibility and the Budget Management Bill	Public Private Partnership	National Knowledge Commission	National Farmers Commission/Report of the Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness/ Reconstituted National Rainfed Area Authority	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act	Bifurcation of National Schedule Caste and National Schedule Tribe Commission
Special Economic Zones (New Model of Industrialisation)	Investment Commission of India	Security Exchange Board of India		The Scheduled Tribes ad Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forests Rights) Act, 2006	
	National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council and Investment Commission	Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority		Right to Information	
Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission	Prime Minister Economic Advisory Council			National Urban Street Vendor Policy	

Appendix 2

Decile Average Monthly Per Capita Expenditure of various Social Groups

		Poorest 10 percentile								Richest 90 percentile	
	1999-00	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hindu	ST	167	218	249	280	311	345	383	432	513	863
	SC	192	249	284	316	349	385	430	489	583	937
	OBC	212	274	313	349	386	428	482	552	671	1107
	Gen	258	339	396	452	512	583	674	807	1040	1862
	Gap										
	Gen-ST	91	120	147	172	201	238	291	375	527	999
	Gen-SC	67	90	112	136	163	198	244	318	456	925
	Gen-OBC	47	65	83	103	126	155	192	255	369	755
	2004-05	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hindu	ST	191	258	298	334	371	412	462	526	631	1036
	SC	236	302	343	381	419	464	519	592	710	1180
	OBC	264	336	383	431	479	535	600	692	857	1519
	Gen	319	428	504	577	662	768	911	1122	1497	2938
	Gap										
	Gen-ST	128	169	206	243	291	356	449	595	866	1902
	Gen-SC	84	125	161	196	243	304	392	529	787	1758
	Gen-OBC	55	92	121	146	183	233	311	430	640	1419
Difference over the period		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	Gen-ST	37	49	59	71	90	117	158	220	339	903
	Gen-SC	17	35	49	60	80	105	148	211	331	834
	Gen-OBC	9	27	38	43	57	78	119	175	271	664

Decile Average Monthly Per Capita Expenditure

Annexure III
Field Area of Case Study on Social Conflict and Development

(a) SEVA MANDIR: (South Rajasthan- Bordering Gujarat)

Objective - Empowerment of the least advantaged in society
Target Group and Area - Rural population in Udaipur district in Rajasthan
Intervention - Strengthening livelihood of village communities, Building local capabilities in areas of health, education and gender equality, creating autonomous village level institutions

(b) MARAG (South West Gujarat - Katch)

Objective- Empowerment of the disadvantaged, especially the Maldhari community in Kutch
Target Groups and Area - Maldhari community in Bhuj and Rapar blocks in Kutchh and Chotila, Sayla and Patadi blocks of Surendranagar
Intervention- Focus on natural resource development and human resource development while also trying to do away with age old reactionary customs and traditions like bride purchase and child marriage.

MANAV KALYAN TRUST (Northern Gujarat – Sabarkantha)

Objective - Empowerment of the poor and tribal and rural people particularly the farmers, cattle rearing families and destitute women and provide them with common platform to voice their concerns and
Target Group - Tribal localities in disaster prone districts of Northern Gujarat and Kutchh region
Intervention – Natural resource management, creating avenues for empowered livelihood opportunities, housing projects, forming micro-credit groups for women, health and education, riot victim rehabilitation programme, sexual health projects.

UMBVS (Western Rajashtha- Jaiselmer and Jodhpur)

Objective- Building up collectives of rural artisans and keeping alive the traditional craft of weaving communities.
Target Group- Organising artisans in villages of Jaisalmer and Jodhpur, especially the Dalits and women
Intervention – Organising weavers and facilitating them with market linkages with a focus of enabling the women of the family to get share in the economic activities